Security of assessments and plans
4.1 Contracting Governments should ensure that
appropriate measures are in place to avoid unauthorized disclosure
of, or access to, security sensitive material relating to ship security
assessments, ship security plans, port facility security assessments
and port facility security plans, and to individual assessments or
plans.
4.2 Contracting Governments may identify a Designated
Authority within Government to undertake their security duties relating
to port facilities as set out in chapter
XI-2 or part A of this Code.
Recognized Security Organizations
4.3 Contracting Governments may authorize a recognized
security organization (RSO) to undertake certain security related
activities, including:
-
.1 approval of ship security plans, or amendments
thereto, on behalf of the Administration;
-
.2 verification and certification of compliance
of ships with the requirements of chapter
XI-2 and part A of this Code
on behalf of the Administration; and
-
.3 conducting port facility security assessments
required by the Contracting Government.
4.4 An RSO may also advise or provide assistance
to Companies or port facilities on security matters, including ship
security assessments, ship security plans, port facility security
assessments and port facility security plans. This can include completion
of a SSA or SSP or PFSA or PFS. If an RSO has done so in respect of
a SSA or SSP that RSO should not be authorized to approve that ship
security plan.
4.5 When authorizing an RSO, Contracting Governments
should give consideration to the competency of such an organization.
An RSO should be able to demonstrate:
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.1 expertise in relevant aspects of security;
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.2 appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations,
including knowledge of ship design and construction if providing services
in respect of ships and port design and construction if providing
services in respect of port facilities;
-
.3 their capability to assess the likely security
risks that could occur during ship and port facility operations including
the ship/port interface and how to minimise such risks;
-
.4 their ability to maintain and improve the expertise
of their personnel;
-
.5 their ability to monitor the continuing trustworthiness
of their personnel;
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.6 their ability to maintain appropriate measures
to avoid unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, security sensitive
material;
-
.7 their knowledge of the requirements chapter XI-2 and part
A of this Code and relevant national and international legislation
and security requirements;
-
.8 their knowledge of current security threats
and patterns;
-
.9 their knowledge on recognition and detection
of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
-
.10 their knowledge on recognition, on a non-discriminatory
basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who
are likely to threaten security;
-
.11 their knowledge on techniques used to circumvent
security measures; and
-
.12 their knowledge of security and surveillance
equipment and systems and their operational limitations.
When delegating specific duties to a RSO, Contracting Governments,
including Administrations, should ensure that the RSO has the competencies
needed to undertake the task.
4.6 A recognized organization, as referred to
in regulation I/6 and fulfilling
the requirements of regulation XI-1/1,
may be appointed as a RSO provided it has the appropriate security–related
expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.
4.7 A port or harbour authority or port facility
operator may be appointed as a RSO provided it has the appropriate
security–related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.
Setting the security level
4.8 In setting the security level, Contracting
Governments should take account of general and specific threat information.
Contracting Governments should set the security level applying to
ships or port facilities at one of three levels:
- Security level 1: normal the level at which the ship or port facility
normally operates;
- Security level 2: heightened the level applying for as long as
there is a heightened risk of a security incident; and
- Security level 3: exceptional the level applying for the period
of time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security
incident.
4.9 Setting security level 3 should be an exceptional
measure applying only when there is credible information that a security
incident is probable or imminent. Security level 3 should only be
set for the duration of the identified security threat or actual security
incident. While the security levels may change from security level
1, through security level 2 to security level 3, it is also possible
that the security levels will change directly from security level
1 to security level 3.
4.10 At all times the master of a ship has the
ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. Even
at security level 3 a master may seek clarification or amendment of
instructions issued by those responding to a security incident, or
threat thereof, if there are reasons to believe that compliance with
any instruction may imperil the safety of the ship.
4.11 The CSO or the SSOshould liase at the earliest
opportunity with the PFSOof the port facility the ship is intended
to visit to establish the security level applying for that ship at
the port facility. Having established contact with a ship, the PFSO
should advise the ship of any subsequent change in the port facility's
security level and should provide the ship with any relevant security
information.
4.12 While there may be circumstances when an
individual ship may be operating at a higher security level than the
port facility it is visiting, there will be no circumstances when
a ship can have a lower security level than the port facility it is
visiting. If a ship has a higher security level than the port facility
it intends to use, the CSO or SSO should advise the PFSO without delay.
The PFSO should undertake an assessment of the particular situation
in consultation with the CSO or SSO and agree on appropriate security
measures with the ship, which may include completion and signing of
a Declaration of Security.
4.13 Contracting Governments should consider how
information on changes in security levels should be promulgated rapidly.
Administrations may wish to use NAVTEX messages or Notices to Mariners
as the method for notifying such changes in security levels to ship
and CSO and SSO. Or, they may wish to consider other methods of communication
that provide equivalent or better speed and coverage. Contracting
Governments should establish means of notifying PFSOs of changes in
security levels. Contracting Governments should compile and maintain
the contact details for a list of those who need to be informed of
changes in security levels. Whereas the security level need not be
regarded as being particularly sensitive, the underlying threat information
may be highly sensitive. Contracting Governments should give careful
consideration to the type and detail of the information conveyed and
the method by which it is conveyed, to SSOs, CSOs and PFSOs.
Contact points and information on Port Facility
Security Plans
4.14 Where a port facility has a PFSP, that fact
has to be communicated to the Organization and that information must
also be made available to CSOs and SSOs. No further details of the
PFSP have to be published other than that it is in place. Contracting
Governments should consider establishing either central or regional
points of contact, or other means of providing up to date information
on the locations where PFSPs are in place, together with contact details
for the relevant PFSO. The existence of such contact points should
be publicised. They could also provide information on the recognized
security organizations appointed to act on behalf of the Contracting
Government, together with details of the specific responsibility and
conditions of authority delegated to such recognized security organizations.
4.15 In the case of a port that does not have
a PFSP (and therefore does not have a PFSO) the central or regional
point of contact should be able to identify a suitably qualified person
ashore who can arrange for appropriate security measures to be in
place, if needed, for the duration of the ship's visit.
4.16 Contracting Governments should also provide
the contact details of Government officers to whom an SSO, a CSO and
a PFSO can report security concerns. These Government officers should
assess such reports before taking appropriate action. Such reported
concerns may have a bearing on the security measures falling under
the jurisdiction of another Contracting Government. In that case,
the Contracting Governments should consider contacting their counterpart
in the other Contracting Government to discuss whether remedial action
is appropriate. For this purpose, the contact details of the Government
officers should be communicated to the International Maritime Organization.
4.17 Contracting Governments should also make
the information indicated in paragraphs 4.14 to 4.16, available to
other Contracting Governments on request.
4.18 Contracting Governments are encouraged to
issue appropriate identification documents to Government officials
entitled to board ships or enter port facilities when performing their
official duties and to establish procedures whereby the authenticity
of such documents might be verified.
Fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore
drilling units on location
4.19 Contracting Governments should consider establishing
appropriate security measures for fixed and floating platforms and
mobile offshore drilling units on location to allow interaction with
ships which are required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part
A of this Code footnote.
Ships which are not required to comply with
part A of this Code
4.20 Contracting Governments should consider
establishing appropriate security measures to enhance the security
of ships to which this chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code does not apply and to
ensure that any security provisions applying to such ships allow interaction
with ships to which part A of this Code applies.
Threats to ships and other incidents at sea
4.21 Contracting Governments should provide general
guidance on the measures considered appropriate to reduce the security
risk to ships flying their flag when at sea. They should provide specific
advice on the action to be taken in accordance with security levels
1 to 3, if:
-
.1 there is a change in the security level applying
to the ship while it is at sea, e.g. because of the geographical area
in which it is operating or relating to the ship itself; and
-
.2 there is a security incident or threat thereof
involving the ship while at sea.
Contracting Governments should establish the best methods and
procedures for these purposes. In the case of an imminent attack the
ship should seek to establish direct communication with those responsible
in the flag State for responding to security incidents.
4.22 Contracting Governments should also establish
a point of contact for advice on security for any ship:
4.23 Contracting Governments should offer advice
to ships operating in their territorial sea or having communicated
an intention to enter their territorial sea, which could include advice:
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.1 to alter or delay their intended passage;
-
.2 to navigate on a particular course or proceed
to a specific location;
-
.3 on the availability of any personnel or equipment
that could be placed on the ship;
-
.4 to co-ordinate the passage, arrival into port
or departure from port, to allow escort by patrol craft or aircraft
(fixed-wing or helicopter).
Contracting Governments should remind ships operating in their
territorial sea, or having communicated an intention to enter their
territorial sea, of any temporary restricted areas that they have
published.
4.24 Contracting Governments should recommend
that ships operating in their territorial sea, or having communicated
an intention to enter their territorial sea, implement expeditiously,
for the ship's protection and for the protection of other ships in
the vicinity, any security measure the Contracting Government may
have advised.
4.25 The plans prepared by the Contracting Governments
for the purposes given in paragraph 4.22 should include information
on an appropriate point of contact, available on a 24-hour basis,
within the Contracting Government including the Administration. These
plans should also include information on the circumstances in which
the Administration considers assistance should be sought from nearby
coastal States, and a procedure for liaison between PFSOs and SSOs.
Alternative security agreements
4.26 Contracting Governments, in considering how
to implement chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, may conclude one or
more agreements with one or more Contracting Governments. The scope
of an agreement is limited to short international voyages on fixed
routes between port facilities in the territory of the parties to
the agreement. When concluding an agreement, and thereafter, the Contracting
Governments should consult other Contracting Governments and Administrations
with an interest in the effects of the agreement. Ships flying the
flag of a State that is not party to the agreement should only be
allowed to operate on the fixed routes covered by the agreement if
their Administration agrees that the ship should comply with the provisions
of the agreement and requires the ship to do so. In no case can such
an agreement compromise the level of security of other ships and port
facilities not covered by it, and specifically, all ships covered
by such an agreement may not conduct ship-to-ship activities with
ships not so covered. Any operational interface undertaken by ships
covered by the agreement should be covered by it. The operation of
each agreement must be continually monitored and amended when the
need arises and in any event should be reviewed every 5 years.
Equivalent arrangements for port facilities
4.27 For certain specific port facilities with
limited or special operations but with more than occasional traffic,
it may be appropriate to ensure compliance by security measures equivalent
to those prescribed in chapter XI-2 and
in part A of this Code. This can,
in particular, be the case for terminals such as those attached to
factories, or quaysides with no frequent operations.
4.28 In establishing the minimum safe manning
of a ship the Administration should take into account footnote that the minimum safe manning provisions established
by regulation V/14
footnote only address the safe navigation of the ship. The
Administration should also take into account any additional workload
which may result from the implementation of the SSP and ensure that
the ship is sufficiently and effectively manned. In doing so the Administration
should verify that ships are able to implement the hours of rest and
other measures to address fatigue which have been promulgated by national
law, in the context of all shipboard duties assigned to the various
shipboard personnel.
Control and compliance measures
footnote
4.29
Regulation XI-2/9 describes
the Control and compliance measures applicable to ships under chapter XI-2. It is divided into three
distinct sections; control of ships already in a port, control of
ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government,
and additional provisions applicable to both situations.
4.30
Regulation XI-2/9.1,
Control of ships in port, implements a system for the control of ships
while in the port of a foreign country where duly authorized officers
of the Contracting Government (“duly authorized officers”)
have the right to go on board the ship to verify that the required
certificates are in proper order. Then, if there are clear grounds
to believe the ship does not comply, control measures such as additional
inspections or detention may be taken. This reflects current control
systems. footnote
Regulation
XI-2/9.1 builds on such systems and allows for additional measures
(including expulsion of a ship from a port to be taken as a control
measure) when duly authorized officers have clear grounds for believing
that a ship is in non-compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part
A of this Code. Regulation XI-2/9.3 describes
the safeguards that promote fair and proportionate implementation
of these additional measures.
4.31
Regulation XI-2/9.2 applies
control measures to ensure compliance to ships intending to enter
a port of another Contracting Government and introduces an entirely
different concept of control within chapter
XI-2, applying to security only. Under this regulation measures
may be implemented prior to the ship entering port, to better ensure
security. Just as in regulation XI-2/9.1,
this additional control system is based on the concept of clear grounds
for believing the ship does not comply with chapter
XI-2 or part A of this Code,
and includes significant safeguards in regulations
XI-2/9.2.2 and XI-2/9.2.5 as well as in regulation XI-2/9.3.
4.32 Clear grounds that the ship is not in compliance
means evidence or reliable information that the ship does not correspond
with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, taking into account
the guidance given in this Part of the Code. Such evidence or reliable
information may arise from the duly authorized officer's professional
judgement or observations gained while verifying the ship's International Ship Security Certificate or Interim International Ship Security Certificate issued in accordance with part A of
this Code (“Certificate”) or from other sources. Even
if a valid Certificate is on board the ship, the duly authorized officers
may still have clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in
compliance based on their professional judgment.
4.33 Examples of possible clear grounds under regulations XI-2/9.1 and XI-2/9.2 may include, when relevant:
-
.1 evidence from a review of the Certificate that
it is not valid or it has expired;
-
.2 evidence or reliable information that serious
deficiencies exist in the security equipment, documentation or arrangements
required by chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code;
-
.3 receipt of a report or complaint which, in
the professional judgment of the duly authorized officer, contains
reliable information clearly indicating that the ship does not comply
with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code;
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.4 evidence or observation gained by a duly authorized
officer using professional judgment that the master or ship's personnel
is not familiar with essential shipboard security procedures or cannot
carry out drills related to the security of the ship or that such
procedures or drills have not been carried out;
-
.5 evidence or observation gained by a duly authorized
officer using professional judgment that key members ship's personnel
are not able to establish proper communication with any other key
members of ship's personnel with security responsibilities on board
the ship;
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.6 evidence or reliable information that the ship
has embarked persons, or loaded stores or goods at a port facility
or from another ship where either the port facility or the other ship
is in violation of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship in question
has not completed a Declaration of Security, nor taken appropriate,
special or additional security measures or has not maintained appropriate
ship security procedures;
-
.7 evidence or reliable information that the ship
has embarked persons, or loaded stores or goods at a port facility
or from another source (e.g., another ship or helicopter transfer)
where either the port facility or the other source is not required
to comply with chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship has not
taken appropriate, special or additional security measures or has
not maintained appropriate security procedures; and
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.8 the ship holding a subsequent, consecutively
issued Interim International Ship
Security Certificate as described in section A/19.4, and if, in the professional judgment of an
officer duly authorized, one of the purposes of the ship or a Company
in requesting such a Certificate is to avoid full compliance with chapter XI-2 and part
A of this Code beyond the period of the initial Interim Certificate
as described in section A/19.4.4.
4.34 The international law implications of regulation XI-2/9 are particularly relevant,
and the regulation should be implemented with regulation
XI-2/2.4 in mind, as the potential exists for situations where
either measures will be taken which fall outside the scope of chapter XI-2, or where rights of affected
ships, outside chapter XI-2, should
be considered. Thus, regulation XI-2/9 does
not prejudice the Contracting Government from taking measures having
a basis in, and consistent with, international law, to ensure the
safety or security of persons, ships, port facilities and other property
in cases where the ship, although in compliance with chapter XI-2 and part
A of this Code, is still considered to present a security risk.
4.35 When a Contracting Government imposes control
measures on a ship, the Administration should, without delay, be contacted
with sufficient information to enable the Administration to fully
liaise with the Contracting Government.
4.36 Where the non-compliance is either a defective
item of equipment or faulty documentation leading to the ship's detention
and the non-compliance cannot be remedied in the port of inspection,
the Contracting Government may allow the ship to sail to another port
provided that any conditions agreed between the port States and the
Administration or master are met.
Ships intending to enter the port of another
Contracting Government
4.37
Regulation XI-2/9.2.1 lists
the information Contracting Governments may require from a ship as
a condition of entry into port. One item of information listed is
confirmation of any special or additional measures taken by the ship
during its last 10calls at a port facility. Examples could include:
-
.1 records of the measures taken while visiting
a port facility located in the territory of a State which is not a
Contracting Government especially those measures that would normally
have been provided by port facilities located in the territories of
Contracting Governments; and
-
.2 any Declarations of Security that were entered
into with port facilities or other ships.
4.38 Another item of information listed, that
may be required as a condition of entry into port, is confirmation
that appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during ship-to-ship
activity conducted within the period of the last 10 calls at a port
facility. It would not normally be required to include records of
transfers of pilots, customs, immigration, security officials nor
bunkering, lightering, loading of supplies and unloading of waste
by ship within port facilities as these would normally fall within
the auspices of the PFSP. Examples of information that might be given
include:
-
.1 records of the measures taken while engaged
in a ship–to–ship activity with a ship flying the flag
of a State which is not a Contracting Government especially those
measures that would normally have been provided by ships flying the
flag of Contracting Governments;
-
.2 records of the measures taken while engaged
in a ship-to–ship activity with a ship that is flying the flag
of a Contracting Government but is not required to comply with the
provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code such as a copy of any
security certificate issued to that ship under other provisions; and
-
.3 in the event that persons or goods rescued
at sea are on board, all known information about such persons or goods,
including their identities when known and the results of any checks
run on behalf of the ship to establish the security status of those
rescued. It is not the intention of chapter
XI-2 or part A of this Code
to delay or prevent the delivery of those in distress at sea to a
place of safety. It is the sole intention of chapter
XI-2 and part A of this Code to provide States with enough
appropriate information to maintain their security integrity.
4.39 Examples of other practical security–related
information that may be required as a condition of entry into port
in order to assist with ensuring the safety and security of persons,
port facilities, ships and other property include:
-
.1 information contained in the Continuous Synopsis
Record;
-
.2 location of the ship at the time the report
is made;
-
.3 expected time of arrival of the ship in port;
-
.4 crew list;
-
.5 general description of cargo aboard the ship;
-
.6 passenger list; and
-
.7 information required to be carried under regulation XI-2/5.
4.40
Regulation XI-2/9.2.5 allows
the master of a ship, upon being informed that the coastal or port
State will implement control measures under regulation
XI-2/9.2, to withdraw the intention for the ship to enter port.
If the master withdraws that intention, regulation
XI-2/9 no longer applies, and any other steps that are taken
must be based on, and consistent with, international law.
4.41 In all cases where a ship is denied entry
or expelled from a port, all known facts should be communicated to
the authorities of relevant States. This communication should consist
of the following when known:
-
.1 name of ship, its flag, the Ship's Identification
Number, call sign, ship type and cargo;
-
.2 reason for denying entry or expulsion from
port or port areas;
-
.3 if relevant, the nature of any security non-compliance;
-
.4 if relevant, details of any attempts made to
rectify any non-compliance, including any conditions imposed on the
ship for the voyage;
-
.5 past port(s) of call and next declared port
of call;
-
.6 time of departure and likely estimated time
of arrival at those ports;
-
.7 any instructions given to ship, e.g., reporting
on route;
-
.8 available information on the security level
at which the ship is currently operating;
-
.9 information regarding any communications the
port State has had with the Administration;
-
.10 contact point within the port State making
the report for the purpose of obtaining further information;
-
.11 crew list; and
-
.12 any other relevant information.
4.42 Relevant States to contact should include
those along the ship's intended passage to its next port, particularly
if the ship intends to enter the territorial sea of that coastal State.
Other relevant States could include previous ports of call, so that
further information might be obtained and security issues relating
to the previous ports resolved.
4.43 In exercising control and compliance measures,
the duly authorized officers should ensure that any measures or steps
imposed are proportionate. Such measures or steps should be reasonable
and of the minimum severity and duration necessary to rectify or mitigate
the non-compliance.
4.44 The word “delay” in regulation XI-2/9.3.5.1 also refers to
situations where, pursuant to actions taken under this regulation,
the ship is unduly denied entry into port or the ship is unduly expelled
from port.
Non-party ships and ships below convention size
4.45 With respect to ships flying the flag of
a State which is not a Contracting Government to the Convention and
not a Party to the 1988 SOLAS Protocol, footnoteContracting
Governments should not give more favourable treatment to such ships.
Accordingly, the requirements of regulation
XI-2/9 and the guidance provided in this Part of the Code should
be applied to those ships.
4.46 Ships below Convention size are subject to
measures by which States maintain security. Such measures should be
taken with due regard to the requirements in chapter
XI-2 and the guidance provided in this Part of the Code.